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Andrew Flavelle Martin* The Impact of the Honour of the Crown
Candice Telfer** on the Ethical Obligations of
Government Lawyers: A Duty of
Honourable Dealing
The honour of the Crown is recognized as a Canadian constitutional principle that
is essential to reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians.
As part of the process of reconciliation, this article argues that the honour of the
Crown imposes a special ethical obligation on government lawyers in specific
circumstances, which we call the duty of honourable dealing. We situate this duty in
the divided literature and case law about whether government lawyers have special
ethical obligations and in the two dimensions in which the honour of the Crown
applies: the Crown as an institution and the Crown as a collection of public servants
in the performance of defined duties. This duty applies when government lawyers are
engaging directly with Indigenous peoples and their representatives in negotiation
contexts. It requires that engagement in negotiation processes be meaningful, with a
candid exchange of positions and views that are carefully and respectfully considered.
L'honneur de la Couronne est reconnu comme un principe constitutionnel canadien
essentiel a la reconciliation entre les Canadiens autochtones et non autochtones.
Dans le cadre du processus de reconciliation, cet article soutient que Ihonneur de la
Couronne impose une obligation ethique speciale aux avocats du gouvemement dans
des circonstances particulires, ce que nous appelons le devoir d'agir honorablement.
Nous situons cette obligation dans la litterature et la jurisprudence qui sont divisees
sur la question de savoir si les avocats du gouvemement ont des obligations
ethiques particulieres et dans les deux dimensions dans lesquelles Ihonneur de la
Couronne s'applique: la Couronne en tant qu'institution et la Couronne en tant que
groupe de fonctionnaires dans Iexecution de fonctions definies. Cette obligation
s'applique lorsque les avocats du gouvemement travaillent directement avec les
peuples autochtones et leurs representants dans des contextes de negociation. Elle
exige que Iengagement dans les processus de negociation soit significatif, avec un
echange franc et sincere de positions et de points de vue qui sont soigneusement et
respectueusement pris en compte.
* Assistant Professor, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia.
** Counsel, Indigenous Affairs Ontario Legal Services Branch, Government of Ontario. All views
and opinions expressed in this article, as well as any errors, are the authors' own and should not
be taken as those of the authors' employing institutions. Although we draw on our experience as
government lawyers, we do not speak for current or past clients.
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Ethics, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University, in October 2017. The authors thank attendees
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Introduction
This article examines the ethical obligations of government lawyers in
relation to the honour of the Crown, the constitutional principle underlying
the Crown's relationship with Indigenous peoples.
Indigenous peoples1 have a special constitutional status in Canada, as
well as a long and troubled political history marred by racist, assimilationist
and culturally devastating colonial policies. From the inclusion of explicit
recognition and protection for Aboriginal rights under section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982, through the development of case law and policy
1. We generally use the term Indigenous, consistent with our understanding of the preferred
terminology of Indigenous peoples as consistent with international norms (see United Nations
Declaration on the Rights ofIndigenous Peoples, UNGAOR 61st Sess, Supp No 53, UN Doc A/61/53
(2007)), except when referring to section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
CanadaAct 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Constitution Act, 1982] and associated case law, where we use the
term Aboriginal. Section 35 states in part:
35 (1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby
recognized and affirmed.
(2) In this Act, "'aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes the Indian, Inuit and Metis peoples
of Canada ...
Consequently, we occasionally use the terms Indigenous and Aboriginal interchangeably. No offence
or statement of position is intended by this usage.
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aimed at solidifying that recognition and protection, to the recent calls by
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to face our colonial past and
move forward in a new and committed way, reconciliation has become
the defining theme in Canada's law and politics as it relates to Indigenous
peoples.2 The Commission defined reconciliation as "about establishing
and maintaining a mutually respectful relationship between Aboriginal
and non-Aboriginal peoples in this country."3
A robust and meaningful approach to the honour of the Crown is
essential to advancing reconciliation. The Supreme Court of Canada stated:
"The Crown's honour cannot be interpreted narrowly or technically, but
must be given full effect in order to promote the process of reconciliation
mandated by s. 35(1).1
4
Many stakeholders across Canada are re-examining their approaches
to Indigenous peoples as they work towards reconciliation. Prominent
among these stakeholders are governments, at both the provincial and
federal levels, and the legal profession. At the intersection of governments
and the legal profession are government lawyers. In particular, the lawyers
who advise and represent governments in their dealings with Indigenous
peoples are integral to the successful commitment to reconciliation.
We argue that in specific circumstances where government lawyers
are engaging directly with Indigenous peoples and their representatives
outside the litigation context, the honour of the Crown imposes an
additional ethical obligation on government lawyers: a duty of honourable
dealing.6 While such a duty may suggest a moderation of the typical duty
2. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada: Calls to Action (Winnipeg: The Commission,
2015), online (pdf): <nctr.ca/assets/reports/Calls to Action English2.pdf> [perma.cc/HRA9-BTTA]
[TRC Calls to Action]. See, e.g., Mikisew Cree FirstNation v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage),
2005 SCC 69 at para 1, [2005] 3 SCR 388 [Mikisew Cree]; Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister
of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 at paras 32, 62, [2004] 3 SCR 511 [Haida Nation]; Delgamuukw v British
Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at para 186, 153 DLR (4th) 193 [Delgamuukw].
3. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the
Future: Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada
(Winnipeg: The Commission, 2015) at 6, online (pdf): <nctr.ca/assets/reports/Final / 20Reports/
Executive Summary English Web.pdf> [http://perna.cc/H5FJ-WR5H].
4. Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (ProjectAssessment Director), 2004 SCC 74
at para 24, [2004] 3 SCR 550 [Taku River Tlingit].
5. See, e.g., TRC Calls to Action, supra note 2, Call to Action 27.
6. This possibility in the litigation context is raised, but not evaluated, in casebook scenarios and
questions in Adam M Dodek, "Government Lawyers," in Alice Woolley et al, eds, Lawyers 'Ethics
and ProfessionalRegulation, 3ded (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2017) 595 at 620 and 622 [Dodek,
"Government Lawyers"]. At 620, Dodek asks whether it is ethical to argue a limitations defense
against a claim by an Aboriginal band. At 622, Dodek asks how the views of several commentators on
legal ethics for government lawyers "inform how government lawyers should deal with Indigenous
persons in a legal context," and how the TRC report should "affect government lawyers' interaction
with Indigenous peoples." At 622, Dodek asks whether the adversarial model of litigation "appl[ies]
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of resolute or zealous advocacy, in our view it is better understood as
zealous advocacy to a different purpose. In contexts where the honour
of the Crown is at stake and government lawyers present as the "face" of
the Crown, zealous advocacy must incorporate the unique duties owed by
the Crown client to Indigenous peoples. Our argument is hat government
lawyers have a duty to advocate zealously, not just for the "best" deal for
their client in the sense of the least costly or most advantageous from a
technical perspective, but for the most appropriate and honourable deal
that considers all relevant factors and is consistent with fulfilling their
clients' own legal obligations.
While we will use the established ethical duties of Crown prosecutors
as a point of comparison for our analysis, we do not address the worthwhile
question of whether the honour of the Crown imposes special or additional
ethical obligations on Crown prosecutors, which is outside the scope of
this article.
Our analysis proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we use the established
ethical duties of Crown prosecutors as a point of comparison for our
analysis. We then examine the divided literature and case law addressing
whether government lawyers have special ethical obligations. In Part II, we
discuss the honour of the Crown. We emphasize that this principle applies
to the Crown in two different dimensions: the Crown as an institution
and the Crown as a collection of public servants in the performance of
defined duties. In Part III, we set out the implications of the honour of the
Crown for the ethical obligations of government lawyers. We distinguish
between the government lawyer as advisor and the government lawyer as
the "face" of the Crown. The government lawyer as advisor has the same
ethical obligations as all lawyers to provide competent and candid advice,
and the honour of the Crown as a legal principle is a key component of
such advice. In contrast, when the government lawyer is acting as the
"face" of the Crown in the context of negotiation, we argue that she has
a special ethical obligation of honourable dealing. To conclude, we argue
that government lawyers should wholeheartedly embrace these ethical
obligations.
to government lawyers' dealing with Indigenous litigants? Should it?" The name "duty of honourable
dealing" is inspired by Brent Cotter's "duty of fair dealing" in Brent Cotter, "Lawyers Representing
Public Government and a 'Duty of Fair Dealing,"' paper presented at the Alberta Law Conference
of the Canadian Bar Association (March 2008), reprinted in ibid at 614-619 [Cotter, "Lawyers
Representing Public Government"].
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I. Government lawyers might have special ethical obligations
Before considering how the honour of the Crown impacts government
lawyers' ethical obligations, we consider whether government lawyers as
a class have special ethical obligations. Determining whether government
lawyers have special ethical obligations requires a working definition of
both ethical obligations and government lawyers.
By ethical obligations, we mean obligations the breach of which is
sanctionable by a legal regulator. These obligations come from their status
as lawyers and may also be referred to as "professional" or "regulatory"
obligations. The non-exhaustive sources for these obligations are the rules
of professional conduct and the discipline decisions of the respective
law societies.7 A law society may choose not to enforce some of these
obligations, as some may be considered aspirational and some may not
be disciplinary priorities. But it is the possibility and not the probability
of law society discipline that is determinative. By "special" ethical
obligations, we mean different ethical obligations than other lawyers. As
we discuss below, special ethical obligations may be separated into two
kinds: additional obligations, which are duties beyond those required of
lawyers generally; or higher obligations, which are the same duties with a
higher threshold of compliance.'
The term "government lawyer" may be used narrowly or broadly.
Broadly, government lawyers are "those who are employed by or sub-
contracted to work for federal, provincial, or local governments, related
agencies, and public bodies."9 More narrowly, government lawyers
are "lawyers working for the executive branch"1 or who practice "on
behalf of the executive branch of government at any of the three levels
7. See Alice Woolley, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics in Canada, 2d ed (Toronto: LexisNexis,
2016) at paras 1.50-1.70 [Woolley, Understanding]. See also DeborahMacNair, "Inthe Service of the
Crown: Are Ethical Obligations Different for Government Counsel?" (2006) 84:3 Can Bar Rev 501 at
519, who cautions against considering codes "the exclusive source for ethical obligations" [MacNair,
"Service of the Crown"]. Note that law societies may have additional rules set out inby-laws. See, e.g.,
Law Society of Upper Canada, Continuing Professional Development, By-law 6.1 (1 January 2014),
online: <lso.ca/about-lso/legislation-rules/by-laws> [perma.cc/R6AK-PYVP].
8. See, e.g., Michael H Morris & Sandra Nishikawa, "The Orphans of Legal Ethics: Why
government lawyers are different-and how we protect and promote that difference in service of the
rule of law and the public interest" (2013) 26 Can J Admin L & Prac 171 at 172, who appear to make
this distinction, and Adam Dodek, "The 'Unique Role' of Government Lawyers in Canada" (2016)
49:1 Israel LR 23 at 28 [Dodek, "Unique Role"] who quotes them at 172 and appears to use the terms
"separate" and "higher" as we use "additional" and "higher."
9. Allan C Hutchinson, " 'In the Public Interest': The Responsibilities and Rights of Government
Lawyers" (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall LJ 105 at 112.
10. Adam M Dodek, "Lawyering at the Intersection of Public Law and Legal Ethics: Government
Lawyers as Custodians of the Rule of Law" (2010) 33 Dal LJ 1 at 9 [Dodek, "Intersection"].
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of government."11 Our focus in this article is in the narrow sense, i.e.
lawyers who are employed by and represent the executive. We exclude
non-practicing lawyers, as in lawyers employed by the government that do
not practice law in the course of their duties.
1. Crown prosecutors as a starting point
It is widely accepted that Crown prosecutors have special ethical duties.
The classic and widely quoted articulation is from Boucher v. The Queen:
[T]he purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to obtain a conviction, it
is to lay before a jury what the Crown considers to be credible evidence
relevant to what is alleged to be a crime. Counsel have a duty to see that
all available legal proof of the facts is presented: it should be done firmly
and pressed to its legitimate strength but it must also be done fairly. The
role of prosecutor excludes any notion of winning or losing.2
Equivalent language has been incorporated into the rules of professional
conduct, so these duties are unquestionably ethical obligations. For
example, the FLSC Model Code of Professional Conduct states that
"When engaged as a prosecutor, the lawyer's primary duty is not to seek
to convict but to see that justice is done through a fair trial on the merits.
The prosecutor exercises a public function involving much discretion and
power and must act fairly and dispassionately."13 Similarly, Brent Olthuis
refers to these as "duties of fairness,"14 and Robert Frater emphasizes an
"overriding commitment to fairness."15
One explanation for this special ethical duty, which may be referred
to as a "duty of impartiality,"6 is that the Crown prosecutor has no client
per se:
One singular feature which distinguishes Crown prosecutors from
defence counsel and other members of the legal profession is that they
do not have an identifiable client. This has been interpreted to mean that
they have a shared duty both to the Court and to the public at large so
that they can present any evidence that is available which may either
11. Dodek, "Unique Role," supra note 8 at 25.
12. [1955] SCR 16 at 23-24, 110 CCC 263.
13. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct (Ottawa:
FLSC, 2009, last amended March 2017) r 5.1-3, commentary 1, online (pdf): <flsc.ca/wp-contentl/
uploads/2018/03/Model-Code-as-amended-March-2017-Final.pdf> [perma.cc/MD8X-95SD] [FLSC
Model Code].
14. Brent Olthuis, "Prosecutorial Conduct," in Adam M Dodek, ed, Canadian Legal Practice: A
Guide for the 21st Century (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2017) (looseleaf, release 50-5) Chapter 3 at
para 3.225, 3-87.
15. Robert J Frater, Prosecutorial Misconduct, 2d ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2017) at 2.
16. New Brunswick v Rothmans, 2009 NBQB 198 at para 17, 352 NBR (2d) 226 [Rothmans], aff'd
on other grounds 2010 NBCA 35, 357 NBR (2d) 160 [Rothmans CA].
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exonerate or convict an accused.'
As Alice Woolley puts it, "the real ethical challenge of the prosecutor, ... is
that she is asked to occupy the position of both the client and the lawyer."18
This duty contrasts sharply with the lawyer's general duty of
"resolut[e]" or zealous advocacy.19 Instead, it is sometimes described as a
tempered or moderated advocacy. For example, David Layton and Michel
Proulx use the phrase "controlled zeal" and state that "[t]he distinctive
feature of the prosecutor's role as advocate is zealousness tempered by the
general duty to seek justice, not simply convictions."2
2. The case law is not determinative
It is unclear whether government lawyers other than Crown prosecutors
have special ethical obligations. The case law is sparse and somewhat
contradictory. Superior courts in Ontario and New Brunswick have come
to seemingly opposite conclusions and no appellate court has decided the
issue.
Oddly, this case law arises not from appeals or judicial reviews of law
society disciplinary decisions-in which courts would be ruling on law
societies' interpretations of the ethical obligations of lawyers-but instead
in the course of deciding other legal questions.
In Ontario, the law is clear. The Divisional Court in Everingham v.
Ontario held that "[a]ll lawyers in Ontario are subject to the same single
high standard of professional conduct... [i]n respect of their liability under
the Rules of Professional Conduct, ... Crown counsel stand on exactly the
17. DeborahMacNair, "CrownProsecutors and Conflict of Interest: A Canadian Perspective" (2002)
7 Can CrimL Rev 257 at 262. See also Woolley, Understanding, supra note 7 atparas 9.7 and 9.8 [note
omitted]: "[W]hat the Crown wants in any particular case, and how ethically to achieve that outcome,
is something that the prosecutor has to determine without the benefit of discussion with, or direction
from, a client. The Crown prosecutor has responsibility for ethical choices that other lawyers do not
have the authority to make. Courts and ethical rules address the prosecutor's distinct ethical position
in part by giving the prosecutor express and specific power and responsibility to make decisions that
would ordinarily be made by clients, namely, when and whether to pursue a case." See also Rothmans,
supra note 16 at paras 17, 20: "[T]he duty of impartiality of a Crown prosecutor is closely related
to the prosecutorial discretion vested in the Crown prosecutor ....The core elements of prosecutorial
discretion... are, in my opinion, directly analogous to the decision-making powers that can only be
exercised by a client in a civil case."
18. Woolley, Understanding, supra note 7 at para 9.22.
19. FLSC Model Code, supra note 13, r 5.1-1: "When acting as an advocate, a lawyer must represent
the client resolutely and honourably within the limits of the law, while treating the tribunal with
candour, fairness, courtesy and respect."
20. David Layton & Hon Michel Proulx, Ethics and Criminal Law, 2d ed (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2015) at 587 ("controlled zeal") and 621 (tempered zealousness). Woolley discusses the "controlled
zeal" language at Woolley, Understanding, supra note 7 at para 9.13. See also Rothmans, supra note
16 at para 20: "Understandably, the Crown prosecutor cannot be permitted to act with excessive or
untempered zeal in pursuing convictions."
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same footing as every member of the bar."21 The Court explicitly rejected
the reasoning of the motion judge Borins J that government lawyers
"have a higher obligation than lawyers generally" and that "there is a
special responsibility on the part of government lawyers to be particularly
sensitive to the rules of professional conduct."22
In Everingham, a government lawyer was removed as counsel after
he spoke directly with one of the (represented) applicants in the secure
psychiatric facility where the applicant was detained. The motion judge
held that the conversation breached the rule of professional conduct against
contact with represented parties. It was in this context that the motion
judge held that government lawyers have higher ethical obligations.23 His
reasoning was that since the government must act in the public interest
and do so lawfully, a government lawyer "assumes a public trust" and
"represents the public interest."2 4
The Divisional Court acknowledged that the Attorney General has
"special public obligations.., in relation to the public interest in the legal
profession and the conduct of government business according to law"
and that Crown prosecutors have "unique obligations... in the conduct of
public prosecutions."25 However, the Court held that these "public interest
duties associated with their office" support judges' higher expectations
of "conduct and expertise" but not "a higher standard under the Rules
of Professional Conduct."26 The Court thus recognized that government
lawyers have special public interest duties, but that those duties are not
ethical duties-which, as we explain below, is a common theme in the
literature. The Divisional Court also noted, without elaborating, that "[i]t
is not flattering to the lawyers of Ontario to say that most of them are held
to a lower standard of professional conduct than government lawyers."27
21. Everingham v Ontario (1992), 8 OR (3d) 121 at 125-126,88DLR (4th)755 (Div Ct) [Everinghham
Div Ct], aff'g on other grounds (1991) 84 DLR (4th) 354, 3 CPC (3d) 87 (Ont GenDiv) [Everiugham
Gen Div cited to DLR]. Everingham Div Ct is widely quoted and discussed in the literature on special
ethical obligations for government lawyers. See, e.g., Dodek, "Intersection," supra note 10 at 15-
17; Hutchinson, supra note 9 at 113; John Mark Keyes, "Professional Responsibilities of Legislative
Counsel" (2011) 5 JPPL 11 at 14; Patrick J Monahan, "'In the Public Interest': Understanding the
Special Role of the Government Lawyer" (2013) 63 SCLR (2d) 43 at 50-5 1; Malliha Wilson, Tala
Wong & Kevin Hille, "Professionalism and the Public Interest" (2011) 38:1 Adv Q I at 10-12.
22. Everingham Gen Div, supra note 21 at 359-360.
23. Ibid at 357-360; for a similar summary of Everingham Gen Div, see Wilson, Wong & Hille,
supra note 21 at 10.
24. Everingham Gen Div, supra note 21 at 360.
25. Everingham Div Ct, supra note 21 at 125-126, citing Ministry ofthe Attorney GeneralAct, RSO
1990, c M.17 [MAGA] and Law SocietyAct, RSO 1990, c L.8. See esp. MAGA, s 5(b): "The Attorney
General, ... (b) shall see that the administration of public affairs is in accordance with the law."
26. Everingham Div Ct, supra note 21 at 125.
27. Ibid at 126.
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The Court, holding that the lawyer did not breach the rule, nonetheless
upheld the order based on the Court's "inherent jurisdiction.. to deny the
right of audience to counsel when the interests of justice so require.1"28
The broad language used by the Divisional Court in Everingham
appears to preclude both higher and additional obligations. Under a narrow
reading, however, Everingham holds only that government lawyers do
not have higher ethical obligations than other lawyers, leaving open the
possibility that government lawyers have additional ethical obligations.
Such a narrow reading is supported by the subsequent decision of Code
J in 1784049 Ontario Ltd v. Toronto (City), which appears to recognize
an additional ethical obligation of government lawyers. In evaluating a
claim of solicitor-client privilege in light of the crime-fraud exception,
Code J held that the City Solicitor cannot "take an adversarial stance in
litigation.., if it means that City Council will continue to proceed in a
manner that knowingly violates the law."'29 Justice Code relied on the
positive obligation of the Attorney General to ensure that the government
acts lawfully, which he extended to the City Solicitor at the municipal
level via the rule of law.30 However, it is not clear from the reasons of Code
J whether this less-adversarial advocacy is an ethical obligation or solely
a public interest obligation.3 1 Indeed, Code J did not mention Everingham,
which was binding on him.12 This additional ethical duty of less-adversarial
advocacy-if such a duty was indeed recognized in Toronto-is consistent
with a narrow reading of Everingham that precludes only higher ethical
obligations of government lawyers.
The law in New Brunswick is that government lawyers do have
special ethical obligations, specifically additional ethical obligations,
although the exact nature of those obligations remains unclear. In New
Brunswick v. Rothmans Inc, Cyr J of the Court of Queen's Bench held
that government lawyers have "public interest duties" as "the 'guardian
of the public interest' at all times," and that these public interest duties
28. Ibid at 126-127. The result supports a related point in the literature, to which we return below
(see notes 74-76 and accompanying text), that the specific nature of the duties on government lawyers
is not particularly meaningful. Even though the rule was not breached, the lawyer was nonetheless
removed in the public interest, and the end result was the same.
29. 1784049 Ontario Ltdv Toronto (City), 2010 ONSC 1204, 101 OR (3d) 505 atpara 39 [Toronto].
This decision by Code J is widely quoted and discussed in the literature on special ethical obligations
for government lawyers, though not quite as often as Everingham Div Ct, supra note 21. See, e.g.,
Dodek, "Intersection," supra note 10 at 27; Wilson, Wong & Hille, supra note 21 at 13.
30. Toronto, supra note 29 at paras 38-39.
31. Indeed, Keyes, supra note 21 at 15-16 cites Toronto for the proposition that public interest
duties are not ethical duties. While that characterization of Toronto is reasonable, so is the opposite
characterization, i.e. that these duties are ethical duties.
32. It is not clear whether Everingham Div Ct was raised by counsel before Justice Code.
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are "additional ethical duties."33 However, Cyr J did not specify what
exactly these additional duties are and require, other than holding that they
are lesser than and do not include the "duty of impartiality" of Crown
prosecutors.34 Moreover, his holdings about government lawyers' ethical
obligations are likely obiter. The relevant issue on the motions was whether
the government's outside counsel, retained on a contingency basis, had a
"disqualifying conflict of interest between its public duties as counsel for
the Attorney General and its substantial private financial interests under
the [contingency agreement]."" Justice Cyr rejected this submission in
part based on his conclusion that although government lawyers have
"public interest" duties that are ethical duties, these duties do not apply
to outside counsel.'6 The conclusion that government lawyers have ethical
"public interest" duties is therefore not necessary for the holding. Instead,
the ratio in the case can be more narrowly stated: even if government
lawyers have "public interest" duties, and even if those are ethical duties,
those duties do not apply to outside counsel. The reasoning in Rothmans is
therefore persuasive at most.
The limited case law that exists exhibits a fundamental divide.
Rothmans recognizes that government lawyers have public interest
obligations, and those public interest obligations constitute special ethical
obligations. In contrast, the reasons of the Divisional Court in Everingham
recognize those same public interest obligations but conclude that they do
not constitute special ethical obligations. Indeed, the Court stated quite
explicitly that government lawyers do not have special ethical obligations,
although it is unclear whether the holding precludes all special ethical
obligations or only higher ones.
33. Rothmans, supra note 16 at paras 22, 33. Like Toronto, Rothmans is quoted and discussed in the
literature on special ethical obligations for government lawyers, although not as often as Everingham
Div Ct, see, e.g., Dodek, "Intersection," supra note 10 at 17 and Wilson, Wong & Hille, supra note 21
at 12-13. While the decision of the motionjudge was appealed to the New Brunswick Court of Appeal,
leave to appeal was denied on this issue: [2009] NBJ No 292, No 293 (CA) (QL). Leave to appeal to
the SCC on these denials was refused: [2009] SCCANo 518, No 519 (QL). The Court of Appeal noted
these denials inRothmans CA, supra note 16 at paras 7-10. Justice Cyr did not mention Evermngham,
and it is unclear whether it was raised by counsel before him.
34. Rothmans, supra note 16 at para 32. For a similar description of Rothmans, see Wilson, Wong
& Hille, supra note 21 at 12. Justice Cyr did rely on and adopt much of Lorne Sossin's expert report:
Expert Report of Professor Lorne Sossin inRothmans, court file No F/C/88/08. As we explain further
below, Sossin does articulate these duties - and while Cyr J did not adopt these parts of the report, they
may have informed his reasoning.
35. Rothmans, supra note 16 at para 4.
36. Ibid at paras 33, 65. We note, although not central to our analysis in this article, that this holding
promotes a problematic outsourcing of legal services to avoid ethical obligations.
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3. The literature is divided
A similar divide exists in the literature. On one side, Adam Dodek, Brent
Cotter, and Lorne Sossin argue that government lawyers have special
ethical "public interest" duties as government agents or delegates of the
Attorney General-although they disagree as to what exactly those special
ethical obligations are. On the other side, Deborah MacNair and others
acknowledge those same public interest duties but argue, for a wide range
of reasons, that these duties are not special ethical obligations.
Dodek, Cotter, and Sossin agree that government lawyers' special
ethical obligations are rooted in their status as government agents
or delegates of the Attorney General, although they differ in how they
articulate those special ethical obligations. Dodek argues that government
lawyers have special ethical obligations "as custodians of the rule of
law."37 These obligations arise "because they exercise public power" both
as public servants and as delegates of the Attorney General,38 so they share
and fulfill her positive obligation to "see that the administration of public
affairs is in accordance with the law."39 Dodek suggests that specifics may
include an obligation to "provide objective and independent advice" and
to "not exploit loopholes in the law in sanctioning government action
or rely on technicalities in litigation.14 He also suggests that this duty
includes a moderation of zealous advocacy in at least some public law
litigation, although the specifics are unclear.41 Dodek also identifies "a
special responsibility to protect the independence of the judiciary" and the
independence of the bar.
42
Similarly, Cotter argues that the special ethical obligations of
government lawyers are "'public interest' responsibilities" rooted in the
government's public interest duties.43 He characterizes the special ethical
37. Dodek, "Intersection," supra note 10 at 8, 25. See also Dodek, "Unique Role," supra note 8 at
27.
38. Dodek, "Intersection," supra note 10 at 18-22 (quotation is from 18). See also Dodek, "Unique
Role," supra note 8 at 28.
39. MAGA, supra note 25, s 5(b), as quoted in and discussed inDodek, "Intersection," supra note 10
at 20. See also, as quoted by Dodek, "Intersection," ibid at 20 note 75, Department ofJustice Act, RSC
1985, c J-2, s 4(a) [DJA]: "see that the administration of public affairs is in accordance with the law."
See also Dodek, "Unique Role," supra note 8 at 32, 33, 38, 41.
40. Dodek, "Intersection," supra note 10 at 29, quoting John C Tait, "The Public Service Lawyer,
Service to the Client and the Rule of Law" (1997) 23 Commonwealth L Bull 542 at 543-544, and 30.
We do not separately consider Tait but only because he is unclear as to whether this special obligation
of government lawyers is an ethical obligation.
41. Dodek, "Unique Role," supra note 8 at 35-37.
42. Dodek, "Intersection," supra note 10 at 30-31 (quote from 30).
43. Cotter, "Lawyers Representing Public Government," supra note 6 at 614-615. Cotter at 615
criticizes a duty to the "public interest" as "vacuous ... and potentially dangerous." As we discuss
below, a fair criticism of Cotter is that he too readily transfers the duty of the client into the duty of the
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obligation as a "duty of fair dealing" owed "to the community of interest
in opposition to the government."44 This duty includes "admitting what
should reasonably be admitted, conceding what should reasonably be
conceded, accommodating what should reasonably be accommodated."45
Cotter describes his "duty of fair dealing" as "a moderation of zealous
advocacy" and explicitly analogizes this "duty of fair dealing" to the
special duties of Crown prosecutors.46
Sossin also argues that government lawyers have special ethical
duties: "a duty to act in the public interest, to ensure that their activities
do not give rise to a perception of personal benefit, and to act independent
of partisan or political preferences."47 Like Dodek, Sossin identifies "the
government lawyer's duty to uphold the rule of law."4 Sossin anchors
these duties in "clear academic and judicial authority for the view that all
government lawyers do owe specific ethical and professional obligations by
virtue of the status of government lawyers as public servants, and by virtue
of the Attorney General's obligation to act in the public interest."49 Unlike
Cotter, Sossin contrasts the special ethical obligations of government
lawyers with those of Crown prosecutors, although e places both groups
on a single spectrum.
In contrast to Dodek, Cotter, and Sossin, others-almost all of whom
are government lawyers-argue that there are no special ethical obligations
on government lawyers. While they largely recognize "public interest"
duties, these commentators argue that such duties do not constitute
ethical duties.1 Patrick Monahan argues that government lawyers have a
lawyer. See below note 71 and accompanying text.
44. Ibid at 615. See also W Brent Cotter, QC, "The Legal Accountability of Governments and
Politicians: A Reflection upon Their Roles and Responsibilities" (2007) 2 JPPL 63, where Cotter
emphasizes this duty as one of a government to its citizens. Dodek, "Intersection," supra note 10 at
29 says of Cotter, "Lawyers Representing Public Government": "I agree conceptually with Cotter's
approach, but ultimately I feel that it is too difficult to translate into practical guiding principles for
government lawyers, the courts and the public." See also Gavin MacKenzie, Lawyers & Ethics:
Professional Responsibility and Discipline (Toronto: Carswell, 2018) (looseleaf, release 2018-1)
Ch 21 at 21.3, 21-3, who identifies a similar rationale for a higher duty in some American cases:
"The rationale for imposing this higher duty on government lawyers is that all citizens are entitled to
fairness in dealing with their government, and that public confidence in governmental fairness would
be eroded if government lawyers were to deploy questionable negotiation strategies or tactics intended
to harass, delay or obstruct."
45. Cotter, "Lawyers Representing Public Government," supra note 6 at 618.
46. Ibid at 617-619, quotation from 619.
47. Sossin, supra note 34 at para 33.
48. Ibid at para 30.
49. Ibid at para 29 [emphasis omitted].
50. Ibid at paras 22-28.
51. This is how Dodek characterizes the opposing literature, and that characterization seems fair.
See Dodek, "Intersection," supra note 10 at 17: "While acknowledging the public interest obligations
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"public interest role," which comes from the Attorney General's positive
obligation and includes a "responsibility to uphold and advance the rule of
law" and an "overarching responsibility.. to advance the public interest."52
Similarly, Michael H Morris and Sandra Nishikawa recognize a public
interest duty situated within the responsibilities of public servants and the
positive obligation of the Attorney General;53 Allan Hutchinson argues that
government lawyers "have a much greater obligation to consider the public
interest in their decisions and dealings with others" than other lawyers;
54
John Mark Keyes recognizes "an obligation to consider the public
interest";55 Malliha Wilson, Taia Wong, and Kevin Hille acknowledge that
"government lawyers are guided by public interest imperatives";5 6 and
Deborah MacNair argues that "the 'public interest' informs [government
lawyers'] duties, mission and vision"5 7 and that "there is a broader, ill-
defined notion of acting in the public interest in the case of the public
sector lawyer."5'
These "public interest" duties may be quite specific. For example,
Monahan identifies "[he obligation to act in an independent and impartial
manner, independently of partisan political considerations," which
includes an "adherence to principled consistency."59 Similarly, MacNair
contemplates "a duty to use government litigation and other resources
efficiently and to avoid waste of public funds; a duty to ensure that their
representation before the courts is fair and accurate; a duty to avoid letting
personal values and biases override the public policy choices of client
officials and the Crown; a duty to respect the public interest role in their
work where it is appropiate to do so."1
60
of government lawyers, government lawyers Deborah MacNair and John Mark Keyes conclude that
these obligations do not translate into higher ethical duties." [Citations to MacNair, "Service of the
Crown," supra note 7 and Keyes, supra note 21 omitted]. See more recently Dodek, "Unique Role,"
supra note 8 at 28: "Government lawyers who have written on the subject argue compellingly that as
agents of the Attorney General they have 'special duties', but they strongly resist the notion that those
special public law duties translate into higher ethical duties." [Citations to Wilson, Wong & Hille,
supra note 21, Morris & Nishikawa, supra note 8, and Monahan, supra note 21 omitted.] Hutchinson,
supra note 9, though not a government lawyer, fits loosely with this group. He recognizes public
interest obligations and does not characterize them as special ethical obligations, but neither does he
explicitly rule out special ethical obligations.
52. Supra note 21 at 43, 45, 54.
53. Supra note 8 at 174-178
54. Supra note 9 at 114.
55. Supra note 21 at 15.
56. Supra note 21 at 9.
57. MacNair, "Service of the Crown," supra note 7 at 507.
58. Deborah MacNair, "The Role of the Federal Public Sector Lawyer: From Polyester to Silk"
(2001) 50 UNBLJ 125 at 129 [MacNair, "Federal Public Sector Lawyer"].
59. Supra note 21 at 45-46, quoting and discussing Tait, supra note 40 at 543-544.
60. MacNair, "Service of the Crown," supra note 7 at 528.
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For at least four reasons, these authors argue that these "public interest"
duties are not ethical duties.1 First, the public interest is "amorphous" and
"dynamic":
because there are so many competing notions of what comprises the
public interest and how it should apply in particular situations, it is a
notoriously difficult and contested task to designate what ends are in the
public interest and what means-which must also be consistent with the
public interest-are best pursued to realize those ends.63
Second, it is for lawyers' superiors, including political masters, and not
lawyers themselves to determine the public interest.64 One example of this
is the decision whether or not a possible defence is inappropriate because
it is a technicality.65 Similarly, it is for the Attorney General herself to
exercise her positive obligation to ensure lawfulness in government
and to protect the public interest, while government lawyers merely
"empowe[r]" her to do so.66 Third, zealous advocacy is itself in the public
interest because it provides the best outcomes.67 Fourth, the public interest
duties of government lawyers are inward-looking or internal, such as the
"responsibility to advocate for, and defend, values of legality and the rule
of law within government"6 and "to exercise critical powers of persuasion
and education in respect of their public sector clients."69
There are two other important arguments about apparent sources
of special ethical obligations on government lawyers. First, any special
legal or other obligations on the client do not necessarily translate into
61. See most explicitly ibidat 516, 528; Keyes, supra note 21 at 15-16; Wilson, Wong& Hille, supra
note 21 at 14; and less explicitly, Monahan, supra note 21 at 49-52 and Morris & Nishikawa, supra
note 8 at 172.
62. Wilson, Wong & Hille, supra note 21 at 17. See also MacNair, "Service of the Crown," supra
note 7 at 516: "the amorphous nature of public interest obligations for all public officials."
63. Hutchinson, supra note 9 at 115-116; Keyes, supra note 21 at 25: "what is in the public interest
is often difficult to define, if not a matter of some controversy."
64. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 9 at 117, 119-122. "[W]hile acting in the public interest, they
must ultimately defer to the views of their superiors as to what ends and means are in the public
interest." (ibid at 124); Keyes, supra note 21 at 20; Monahan, supra note 21 at 52; Wilson, Wong &
Hille, supra note 21 at 15-16; Morris & Nishikawa, supra note 8 at 175-176, citing Tait, supra note 40
at 547-548.
65. Monahan, supra note 21 at 52.
66. Wilson, Wong & Hille, supra note 21 at 15-16.
67. See, e.g., Wilson, Wong & Hille, supra note 21 at 17; Hutchinson, supra note 9 at 119, 124.
68. Monahan, supra note 21 at 55.
69. Morris & Nishikawa, supra note 8 at 175. Note that Dodek also supports such as inward-looking
role: "Government lawyers are involved in protecting the rule of law from the inside." (Dodek,
"Intersection," supra note 10 at 23.) However, he does not seem to see such an inward-looking role
as being inconsistent with special ethical obligations. See also Hutchinson, supra note 9 at 120-121:
"government lawyers have a significant contribution to make in debates within government about how
to determine what the public interest demands."
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special ethical obligations on the lawyer. As MacNair puts it, "[i]t is
easy to confuse the ethical obligations of government counsel with the
legal obligations of clients. 70 In this respect, a fair criticism of Cotter
is that he too readily transfers the duties of government to government
lawyers. A second argument, echoing the reasons of the Divisional Court
in Everingham, is that higher expectations of government lawyers do not
create higher ethical duties.
71
Finally, there are arguments about how special ethical obligations
of government lawyers are derived. An argument against special ethical
obligations on government lawyers as a class is that the roles and practice
contexts of government lawyers are too diverse for a uniform set of special
ethical obligations .72 A related argument is that government lawyers are not
analogous to Crown prosecutors, therefore the special ethical obligations
of Crown prosecutors should not be readily extended to other government
lawyers .71
4. Drawing lessons from this debate
As discussed, there is disagreement in the caselaw and literature over
whether government lawyers have special ethical obligations. In Ontario,
Everingham says that they do not; in New Brunswick, Rothmans says they
do. Many commentators argue that government lawyers' public interest
duties, governments' legal obligations, and higher expectations by the
public or judges do not create special ethical obligations for government
lawyers.
Given that government lawyers face higher expectations and have
public interest duties, and that governments have special legal obligations,
does it matter whether government lawyers have special ethical obligations?
Morris and Nishikawa argue that because "the Courts, other lawyers,
and the public at large expect government lawyers to act differently,
...the question whether they should be subject to higher ethical duties [is]
70. MacNair, "Service of the Crown," supra note 7 at 530 [citation omitted].
71. See, e.g., ibid at 517; MacNair, "Federal Public Sector Lawyer," supra note 58 at 145 and
165; Morris & Nishikawa, supra note 8 at 172. See also Keyes, supra note 21 at 13: "it is not that
the standard is higher, but rather that the nature of government as a client produces quite different
expectations."
72. Wilson, Wong & Hille, supra note 21 at 14-15. See also Sossin, supra note 34 at para 22, who
puts government lawyers on a spectrum, with Crown prosecutors being at one end.
73. See, e.g., MacNair, "Service of the Crown," supra note 7 at 513 [citations omitted]: "The
work of Crown prosecutors is driven by public interest imperatives. Historically, the public interest
role has been hived out from others as deserving of special attention and it stands apart historically.
Unfortunately, it can also be used as a stereotype and applied to other government counsel unreservedly
without any further analysis."
458 The Dalhousie Law Journal
somewhat academic."4 Dodek notes that "there are a whole host of areas
where a higher duty is expected of government lawyers." 5 Dodek as well
as Morris and Nishikawa identify Aboriginal law and the honour of the
Crown as one such context of higher expectations.6 Finally, recall that the
Divisional Court in Everingham did not disqualify the government lawyer
for violating a higher ethical obligation to uphold the rules of professional
conduct, but instead used its inherent jurisdiction to disqualify him in the
interests of justice.
On the contrary, we argue that the source and nature of any duties-
and the distinction between special ethical obligations and other kinds of
obligations-matter. The source and nature of a duty determines to whom
the duty is owed, who can complain of a breach, who adjudicates that
complaint and grants a remedy, and what remedy can be granted. A court
may grant the same remedy for the violation of different kinds of duties-
for example, to disqualify counsel or enter a stay of proceedings because
of a breach of duties of the lawyer or legal duties of the government
itself A court may also award damages for a range of reasons. Outside of
the litigation context, however, the consequences for a breach of public
interest duties or higher expectations are unclear. They would seem at
most to be employment consequences, which the government as employer
may be hesitant to impose if the government as client benefitted from the
breach."7 The breach of ethical obligations, however, is a matter for the law
society and can result in professional consequences. The Supreme Court in
Krieger v. Law Society ofAlberta held that law societies must have some
jurisdiction over Crown prosecutors, partly because only law societies
have the power to impose disciplinary penalties." Similar considerations
apply to other breaches by government lawyers. For these reasons, special
ethical obligations matter.
The disagreement in the case law and literature over whether
government lawyers as a class have special ethical obligations is
problematic. Resolving that broader debate is beyond the scope of this
article, but we apply lessons drawn from the debate in this article. We
acknowledge cautions from the literature: against a generalized duty
74. Supra note 8 at 172 [emphasis in original], discussed in Dodek, "Unique Role," supra note 8 at
28.
75. Dodek, "Intersection," supra note 10 at 25-26. Dodek seems to use this point to argue that
special ethical obligations are not a great leap from the status quo-but it seems to also support the
idea that special ethical obligations are not necessary in that they would not change the status quo.
76. Ibid, Morris & Nishikawa, supra note 8 at 174.
77. See, e.g., Dodek, "Intersection," supra note 10 at 12: "The Crown is unlikely to complain to the
law society about the conduct of a government lawyer."
78. 2002 SCC 65 at para 58, [2002] 3 SCR 372.
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to a generalized public interest that applies to government lawyers as a
homogenous class, against transplanting the duties of the government as
client to the government lawyer, and against unsupported comparisons to
Crown prosecutors. But we also see space in the case law for additional
ethical obligations on government lawyers in particular circumstances.
Against this backdrop we argue that government lawyers working in the
area of Indigenous relations, particularly in the context of negotiation,
have a special ethical obligation derived from the legal principle of the
honour of the Crown.
II. The honour of the Crown
The Supreme Court of Canada has defined the "honour of the Crown"
simply (and somewhat autologically) as the principle that the Crown must
conduct itself with honour in its dealings with Aboriginal peoples.79 As a
more practical working definition, the Court has said that the honour of the
Crown prohibits the Crown from any appearance of "sharp dealing" with
Aboriginal peoples."0 Drawing on the case law, we define "sharp dealing"
as engaging without an intention to keep promises, or otherwise coercing
or unilaterally imposing outcomes.81
The Supreme Court has confirmed that when the Crown is interacting
withAboriginal peoples, the "honour ofthe Crown is always at stake."2 The
impetus for the honour of the Crown principle is rooted in colonization,3
79. Manitoba Metis Federation v Canada, 2013 SCC 14 at para 65, [2013] 1 SCR 623 [Manitoba
Metis Federation].
80. This modern approach to defining the honour of the Crown was first clearly articulated in the
post-1982 Supreme Court jurisprudence inR v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 at 1107, 70 DLR (4th)
385 [Sparrow], drawing on decisions of the Ontario Court of Appeal: R vAgawa (1988), 65 OR (2d)
505, 53 DLR (4th) 101 andR v Taylor and Williams (1981), 34 OR (2d) 360,62 CCC (2d) 227) [Taylor
and Williams]. See also Sparrow at 1114; R v Badger, [1996] 1 SCR 771 at para 41, 133 DLR (4th) 324
[Badger]; R vMarshall, [1999] 3 SCR 456 at paras 49-51, 177 DLR (4th) 513 [MarshallNo. 1]; Haida
Nation, supra note 2 at paras 16, 19. However, it should be noted that the honour of the Crown has
long been identified as a key principle in assessing the Crown's relationship with Indigenous peoples;
see in particular Justice Gwynne's dissenting opinion i Province of Ontario v Dominion of Canada
and Province of Quebec In re Indian Claims (1895), 25 SCR 434 at 511-512 [Ontario v Canada]; also
Province of Ontario v Dominion of Canada (1909), 42 SCR 1 at 103-104, Idington J.
81. See Badger, supra note 80, at para 41; reinforced inHaida Nation, supra note 2, at para 42. The
notion of "sharp dealing" as exhibited by coercive Crown approaches i supported by the reference
to United States v Alcea Band of Tillamooks (1946), 329 US 40 and (1951), 341 US 48 in Calder v
Attorney General of British Columbia, [1973] SCR 313, 34 DLR (3d) 145 and the reference to R v
George, [1966] SCR 267, 55 DLR (2d) 386 inMarshall No. 1, supra note 80 at para 51.
82. See, e.g., Badger, supra note 80 at para 41; Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 16. In Manitoba
Metis Federation, supra note 79 at para 68, the Supreme Court referred to para 41 of Badger, but
notably seems to have narrowed the application of the honour of the Crown to dealings ("interactions")
where reconciliation is a goal.
83. See Haida Nation, supra note 2 at paras 17 and 32; Taku River Tlingit, supra note 4 at para 24;
Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 79 at para 66.
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and this was acknowledged by the Crown itself as early as 1763 in King
George III's Royal Proclamation, "in which the British Crown pledged its
honour to the protection of Aboriginal peoples from exploitation by non-
Aboriginal peoples."84 The Supreme Court has imbued the principle with
a grand goal in this context: "the reconciliation of pre-existing Aboriginal
societies with the assertion of Crown sovereignty. " 85
The honour the Crown has come to be enshrined as a constitutional
principle through its specific association in the modem case law with
the protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights accorded by section 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982.86 As a constitutional principle whose goal is
reconciliation, it works to constrain federal and provincial governments
in exercising their legislative powers and to guide them in interpreting
and applying the section 35 Aboriginal rights protections. It also leads to
interpretive restraints: courts will assume the Crown intends to fulfill its
promises to Aboriginal peoples and will hold the Crown to interpretations
of treaty, statutory and constitutional documents that protect and fulfill
those promises.
87
84. Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53 at para 42, [2010] 3 SCR
103 [Beckman]. The Royal Proclamation of 1763, issued under the prerogative power of the King,
addressed matters related to Great Britain's acquisition of New France under the terms of the Treaty
of Paris, 1763. The Proclamation established that treaty-making with Indigenous nations was the
sole purview of the Crown and that direct purchase of "Indian lands" by settlers would no longer be
permitted. (Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed supp (Toronto: Thomson Reuters
Canada, 2017), vol 1 (loose-leaf revision 2017-1), ch 2 at 2.3(b), 2-8; ch 28 at 28.1(a), 28-2; ch 28 at
28.1(c), 28-6).) The Royal Proclamation is given constitutional status through s 25 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 1:
25 The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed so as to
abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the
aboriginal peoples of Canada including
(a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal Proclamation of October
7, 1763...
85. Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 79 at paras 9, 66, 71. See also Haida Nation, supra
note 2 at paras 17 and 20; Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at paras 186 and 204. Jamie D Dickson, The
Honour and Dishonour of the Crown: Making Sense ofAboriginalLaw in Canada (Saskatoon: Purich
Publishing, 2015) provides a good overview of the history and development of the honour of the
Crown principle in the second chapter; 24 ff.
86. See Beckman, supra note 84 in particular at para 97: Deschamps J dissenting, but not on this
point, refers to the four constitutional principles identified in the Reference re Secession of Quebec,
[1998] 2 SCR 217, 161 DLR (4th) 385 [Secession Reference] and notes that these principles are
interwoven with basic compacts, including the compact "between the non-Aboriginal population and
Aboriginal peoples with respect o Aboriginal rights and treaties with Aboriginal peoples." She then
notes that this compact "actually incorporated a fifth principle underlying our Constitution: the honour
of the Crown" See also Beckman at para 42; Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 79 at paras
69-70.
87. SeeBadger, supra note 80 atpara47;R v Van derPeet, [1996] 2 SCR 507 atpara24, 137 DLR
(4th) 289 [Van der Peet]; Beckman, supra note 84 at para 12; Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note
79 at para 70; Peter Ballantyne Cree Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 SKCA 124 at para 41,
485 Sask R 162 [Peter Ballantyne Cree].
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The honour of the Crown is, as the Supreme Court states, "not a
mere incantation,"88 but rather "applies independently of the expressed or
implied intention of the parties."89 In other words, the honour of the Crown
is about substance, not form, and it finds expression in imposing concrete,
practical obligations on the Crown.90 While the honour of the Crown is not
in itself enforceable as a legal cause of action, the breach of these practical
obligations may lead to liability on the part of the Crown.> We characterize
the honour of the Crown principle as operationalizing in two ways that
can lead to liability: 1) it gives rise to specific legal duties, of which the
Crown can be found in breach; and 2) it gives rise to directives about
how the Crown must approach the interpretation of documents, and how
the Crown and Crown agents must conduct themselves in engagements
with Indigenous peoples.9 2 We address these obligations throughout the
following sections.
The honour of the Crown principle has also long been tied to the
fiduciary concept in the jurisprudence.9 3 More recent case law and
88. Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 16.
89. Beckman, supra note 84 atparas 38, 61.
90. Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 79 at para 68; Badger, supra note 80 at para 41. Thomas
Isaac makes a similar point when he states, "Reconciliation flows from the constitutionally protected
rights of Metis protected by section 35 and is inextricably tied to the honour of the Crown, and must be
Prounded in practical actions": Thomas Isaac, A Matter ofNational and Constitutional Import: Report
of the Minister's Special Representative on Reconciliation with Metis: Section 35 Metis Rights and
the Manitoba Metis Federation Decision (Ottawa: Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, 2016) at
3 [emphasis added], online (pdf): <publications.gc.ca/collections/collection 2016/aanc-inac/R5-123-
2016-eng.pdf> [perma.cc/657F-9YGJ]. See also Clyde River (Hamlet) v Petroleum Geo-Services Inc.,
2017 SCC 40 at para 41, [2017] 1 SCR 1069 [Clyde River]: "Engagement of the honour ofthe Crown
does not predispose a certain outcome, but promotes reconciliation by imposing obligations on the
manner and approach of government" (with references to Haida Nation, supra note 2 at paras 49 and
63).
91. Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 79 at paras 70-71; Peter Ballantyne Cree, supra note 87
at para 41.
92. In this way, our approach is similar to that of Dickson, supra note 85, who referred to enforceable
"off-shoots" of the honour of the Crown. However, Dickson was concerned with greater specificity in
describing his off-shoots (the duty to consult, the duty of diligent implementation, and fiduciary duty
obligations; see 10-11, 25, 115-118), and did not address what we describe as the interpretive- and
conduct-related directives. Dickson's detailed and careful approach was advanced in support of his
argument that the honour of the Crown should replace fiduciary obligations in determining Crown
liability regarding the Crown's relationships with Indigenous peoples, and in our view this is not
inconsistent with our different formulation of the enforceable "off-shoots" of the honour of the Crown
93. See Sparrow, supra note 80 at 1109, for example, which ties together the discussion of the
Crown's role as fiduciary vis-a-vis Indigenous peoples in Guerin v The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335, 13
DLR (4th) 321 with the discussion of the honour of the Crown in Taylor and Williams, supra note 80:
"In our opinion, Guerin, together withR. v. Taylor and Williams ...ground a general guiding principle
for s. 35(1). That is, the Government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with respect o
aboriginal peoples. The relationship between the Government and aboriginals is trust-like, rather than
adversarial, and contemporary recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights must be defined in light
of this historic relationship."
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commentary has problematized the relationship between the honour of
the Crown principle and the view of the Crown as a fiduciary vis-i-vis
Indigenous peoples, not least because of criticisms that this approach is
colonial and paternalistic.94 This discussion is beyond the scope of this
article, except to note that while according to the current case law the
honour of the Crown may give rise to fiduciary duties, we are looking at
the honour of the Crown principle as an independent source of duties and
liabilities on the Crown.
95
These duties and liabilities are given practical expression through the
actions and decisions of two distinct dimensions of the Crown: the Crown
as institution and the Crown as a collection of individual Crown servants
in the performance of defined duties.
We have borrowed the notion of "dimensions" in part from the
Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court (PE.), in
which Lamer CJ for the majority of the Supreme Court-building on the
earlier decision in Valente-drew a conceptual distinction between the two
dimensions of the judiciary to which judicial independence attaches.96 The
Chief Justice identified three core characteristics ofjudicial independence,
and noted that the dimensions "indicate which entity-the individual
judge or the court or tribunal to which he or she belongs-is protected
by a particular core characteristic."97 We argue that the honour of the
Crown applies, though in different ways, on both the individual and the
institutional levels.
1. The institutional dimension
By "Crown as institution," we are referring to the Crown in its capacity as
a singular (whether at the federal or provincial level) policy- or decision-
making entity. We include individuals in the political realm such as
ministers of the Crown and appointed statutory decision-makers as part
94. See Justice Deschamps' dissenting opinion in Beckman, supra note 84 at para 105; Peter
Ballantyne Cree, supra note 87 at para 83, adopting Dickson's arguments in Dickson, supra note 85.
Dickson took the view that the honour of the Crown principle should replace fiduciary concepts that
have been imported, in his view non-conventionally, into the Aboriginal jurisprudence as the notion of
basing Crown liability on a fiduciary concept is outdated and redundant; see 17, 45.
95. See Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 18.
96. Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court (PE.I.), [1997] 3 SCR 3 at paras
118-122, 150 DLR (4th) 577 [PEI Judges Reference]; Valente v The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 673, 24
DLR (4th) 161.
97. PEIJudges Reference, supra note 96 at para 119 [emphasis added]. Inthe Aboriginal law context,
this idea of "dimensions" is analogous to the distinction that E Ria Tzimas, in her paper examining
reconciliation and the purpose of consultation, draws between Justice Binnie's decision in Beckman,
which she argues locates consultation at the individual level, and Justice Deschamps' decision, which
locates consultation at the collective level: E Ria Tzimas, "To What End the Dialogue?" (2011) 54
SCLR (2d) 493 at 526.
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of the Crown as institution.98 The Crown as institution is subject to both
specific legal duties and interpretive and conduct-related directives, as
imposed by the honour of the Crown, in a manner different from how those
obligations are imposed on individual Crown servants.
Where a decision by the Crown as institution may adversely impact
asserted or proven section 35 rights, the honour of the Crown imposes the
legal duty to consult and accommodate where appropriate (as a shorthand,
the "duty to consult").99 The Supreme Court's decision in Haida Nation
generally looked at the implications of the honour of the Crown on the
Crown as an institution, in the context of fulfilling the duty to consult. In
Haida Nation, the Court found that when the Crown is acting as a decision-
maker where decisions may impact asserted or proven section 35 rights, it
must "act with good faith to provide meaningful consultation appropriate
to the circumstances" having regard to "the procedural safeguards of
natural justice demanded by administrative law.1
100
The Crown as institution is also subject to interpretive and conduct-
related directives, albeit on a higher and more generalized level than
individual Crown servants. For example, the Supreme Court has been
very clear that the honour of the Crown mandates that "treaties, s. 35(1),
and other statutory and constitutional provisions protecting the interests of
aboriginal peoples, must be given a generous and liberal interpretation" by
the Crown.0 Individual Crown servants, particularly lawyers, have a role
in providing advice related to these directives. However, as we discuss
below, public positions on the interpretation of legal documents, including
in litigation contexts, are positions of the Crown as institution.
2. The individual dimension
In Manitoba M&is Federation, the Supreme Court explicitly addressed
the honour of the Crown in relation to actions of "servants of the Crown,"
attaching the principle to the individual dimension of the honour of the
98. For example, in Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resources
Operations), 2017 SCC 54, [2017] 2 SCR 386, the Supreme Court addresses an appeal of ajudicial
review of a decision of the British Columbia Minister of Forests, Lands and Natural Resources
Operations on the basis, inter alia, that he erred in concluding that the Crown's duty to consult and
accommodate had been met. While the appeal addresses this decision as a decision of this individual-
the Minister-in our conception this represents a decision of the Crown as institution
99. Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 35; Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 79 at paras 73,
76.
100. Supra note 2 at para 41.
101. Van der Peet, supra note 87 at para 24. We also note that inMarshall No. 1, supra note 80, the
Supreme Court set out as a presumption that the Crown will act honourably in its approach to treaty-
making; see para 52 per Binnie J and para 78 per McLachlin J (as she then was, dissenting but not on
this point).
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Crown.102 However, the individual dimension may be evident in the prior
case law.10 3
In Haida Nation, the Supreme Court referred to the honour of the
Crown as "a core precept that finds its application in concrete practices."10 4
The Court has also been clear that reaty-making and implementation
generally are governed by the honour of the Crown, particularly through
the requirements-and concrete practices?-of good faith negotiation and
avoidance of sharp dealing.0 5 The word "dealing" suggests interactions
at a level much more direct and individual than that of high-level and
broad policy-making. Dealing, including sharp dealing, suggests practices
informed by the strategic choices and relational responses of individual
actors, particularly if we define sharp dealing, as above, in terms of
intentions and inducing outcomes. When the Court stated "[i]n all its
dealings with Aboriginal peoples.., the Crown must act honourably," at its
highest it encompasses everything down to the day-to-day interactions of
Crown servants carrying out the business of the Crown.0 6
The term "Crown servants" is broad and the definitional limits of who
may be a Crown servant can be contested. In this article, we are generally
referring to members of the public service tasked with implementing
the government's legislative and policy agenda.10 7 In the context of the
102. Supra note 79 at paras 65, 80.
103. As a very early reference, we note that in Justice Gwynne's dissenting opinion in Ontario v
Canada, supra note 80 he stated at 511-512: "the British sovereigns, ever since the acquisition of
Canada, have been pleased to adopt the rule or practice of entering into agreements with the Indian
nations or tribes ...the terms and conditions expressed in those instruments as to be performed by
or on behalf of the Crown, have always been regarded as involving a trust graciously assumed by
the Crown to the fulfilment of which with the Indians the faith and honour of the Crown is pledged,
and which trust has always been most faithfully fulfilled as a treaty obligation of the Crown." The
reference to "on behalf of the Crown" may be read to implicitly implicate individual Crown servants
in implementing treaty promises as well as institutional components of the Crown like ministries or
agencies.
104. Supra note 2 at para 16 [emphasis added].
105. Ibid at para 19; reaffirmed in Mikisew Cree, supra note 2 at para 33 and Manitoba Metis
Federation, supra note 79 at para 73.
106. Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 17 [emphasis added].
107. See Kerry Wilkins, "Reasoning with the Elephant: The Crown, Its Counsel and Aboriginal Law
in Canada" (2016) 13 Indigenous U 27 at 33-34. Wilkins draws a distinction between the public
service, with its "assigned tasks ... to produce and preserve good government and to do everything
possible consistent with that imperative, and with the law, to assist the government in power to achieve
effectively its legislative and policy agenda" and political staff who are vulnerable to political change.
We note that lawyers for administrative bodies may be Crown servants where it is clear that, as a
function of the legislative authority provided to such a body, it exists to exercise executive powers
(see Clyde River, supra note 90). For our purposes, we also do not consider the implications of this
analysis on outside counsel retained by the Crown, though we acknowledge that is a topic worthy of
exploration We note that it may appear from our analysis, and from the decision in Rothmans, that
approaches that promote the outsourcing of ethical obligations by Crown clients are problematic.
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Crown's relationship with Indigenous peoples, Crown servants play a
particularly important role in providing, as Wilkins notes, "a thorough
understanding of the relevant legal, practical or operational risks and
complexities" associated with political agendas and promises, and in
implementing policy and other initiatives."8
InManitobaMtis Federation, the Supreme Court issued a declaration
"[t]hat the federal Crown failed to implement the land grant provision set
out in s. 31 of the Manitoba Act, 1870 in accordance with the honour
of the Crown.""0 9 This holding has been characterized as creating a new
cause of action-breach of the honour of the Crown."' However, this is
not how the Court operationalized the principle. The Chief Justice and
Karakatsanis J for the majority framed the breach as that of the fulfillment
of a constitutional promise that engages the honour of the Crown or is
based on the honour of the Crown.1 Alternatively, as Justice Rothstein
described it in his dissenting opinion, "a breach of the duty of diligent
fulfillment of solemn obligations." 2 This aligns with the first of the two
ways we have suggested that the honour of the Crown operationalizes:
giving rise to specific legal duties-in this case, the duty of diligent
implementation-of which the Crown can be found in breach.
Importantly, the majority in Manitoba Mtis Federation grounded its
finding that the Crown breached this duty in the actions of individual Crown
servants charged with implementing the constitutional promise in question,
which was to provide land to the children of Mtis heads of household as
promised under s. 31 of the Manitoba Act, 1870. The majority referred to
a "series of errors and delays" that interfered with meeting the promise. 3
The majority acknowledged the unrealistic requirement of perfection in
all acts related to the implementation of a constitutional promise, and
they set the threshold for a breach at "a persistent pattern of errors and
indifference.1 1 4 The focus on "all acts" and "pattern of errors" implicates
the actions and decisions of individual Crown servants. For example, the
Court called out mistakes and inattention in identifying scrip beneficiaries
and then in issuing scrip-a process undertaken by Crown servants as part
of fulfilling the government's agenda of the day. 5 The Court accepted
108. See supra note 107 at 35-36.
109. Supra note 79 at para 154 [emphasis added].
110. See, e.g., Hogg, supra note 84, vol 1, ch 28 at 28.8(k), 28-62.
111. See Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 79 at para 9.
112. Ibid at para 223.
113. Ibid at para 32.
114. Ibid at para 82.
115. Ibid at paras 104, 123. The Canadian government had promised to provide lots of land to Metis
children under s. 31 of the ManitobaAct, 1870, but the implementation of this promise was beset with
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findings of the trial judge that "although they did not act in bad faith, the
government servants may have been negligent in administering the s. 31
grant,.116 and that for the most part "there was no bad faith or misconduct
on the part of the Crown employees."11 Nevertheless, the Court pointed
out that "diligence requires more than simply the absence of bad faith. 118
Although the liability for the breach ultimately attaches to the Crown as
institution, the Court relied on a pattern of lack of diligence by individual
actors to find that the duty of fulfilling this particular promise had been
breached.
This contextual and fact-based approach of looking for a pattern of
conduct is consistent with the idea that the honour of the Crown is about
substance and not form. The Supreme Court has been clear that there is
no pro forma honour of the Crown threshold or duty-"[t]he honour of
the Crown gives rise to different duties in different circumstances."'119 It
follows that in the context of individual Crown servants, the honour of the
Crown may be viewed as more of a code of conduct guiding interactions
and approaches rather than an amorphous and decontextualized label to
apply to such interactions writ large.120
When the individual Crown servants are government lawyers, we
argue that in certain circumstances the honour of the Crown imposes
an additional ethical obligation to the obligations that already apply to
lawyers.
III. Ethical obligations of government lawyers in Indigenous matters
The honour of the Crown applies to the Attorney General and government
lawyers as her delegates. Government lawyers are undoubtedly Crown
servants, as we have broadly defined the term above. Government lawyers
carry out the duties of the Attorney General.121 As the chief law officer
of the Crown, the Attorney General provides legal advice, litigation,
and other legal services for the government and oversees government
challenges and delays. At a certain point, the government decided that for those eligible that had not
yet received land, it would instead provide scrip-$240 redeemable coupons for land (ibid at paras
32-38).
116. Ibid at para 96 [emphasis added].
117. Ibid at paras 96, 109 [emphasis added].
118. Ibidatpara 109.
119. Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 18; see also Beckman, supra note 84 at para 43.
120. Deschamps J in Beckman, supra note 84 (dissenting but not on this point) stated that "the honour
of the Crown is more of a normative legal concept than a description of the Crown's actual conduct";
para 108. As discussed above, Deschamps J took a specifically institutionally-focused approach in that
case; see Tzimas, supra note 97.
121. See, e.g., Dodek, "Intersection," supra note 10 at 18-19.
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legislation and the legislative process.122 However, as discussed above,123
she also has a positive duty to "see that the administration of public affairs
is in accordance with the law.1
124
The implications of the honour of the Crown for the ethical obligations
of government lawyers differ depending on the role those lawyers are
playing. On the level of the individual lawyers working under the Attorney
General, as Wilkins describes:
Facing inward, government lawyers give legal advice and provide
drafting services (contracts, treaties, bills, regulations and other legal
instruments) to their clients .... Facing outward, they support and
participate in the Crown's negotiations with others (the other order of
Crown government, municipalities, Aboriginal communities and/or
other private parties) and represent he Crown in litigation. 1
25
Similar to Wilkins' inward/outward divide, we distinguish between the
inward-facing advisory context and the outward-facing litigation and
negotiation contexts.
1. Lawyer as advisor
In the advisory context, the government lawyer must give advice that
incorporates the honour of the Crown, but in doing so she has the same
ethical obligations as all other lawyers.
The case law has long hinted that the honour of the Crown may have
specific implications for lawyers supporting the Crown's relationships
with Indigenous peoples by explicitly tying the honour of the Crown to
the interpretation and analysis of legal documents. In Badger, the Supreme
Court directed that "[i]nterpretations of treaties and statutory provisions
which have an impact upon treaty or aboriginal rights must be approached
in a manner which maintains the integrity of the Crown. 1 26 While the Court
in Badger used as its starting point principles of treaty interpretation, it
then applied these principles in the context of interpreting a constitutional
document.1 21 In Sparrow, the Court specifically noted the obligation on
122. See, e.g., MAGA, supra note 25, s 5. See also Attorney GeneralAct, RSBC 1996, c 22, s 2 [AGA];
DJA, supra note 39, ss 4-5.
123. See note 39.
124. MAGA, supra note 25, s 5(b); AGA, supra note 122, s 2(b); DJA, supra note 39, s 4(a); Kent
Roach, "Not Just the Government's Lawyer: The Attorney General as Defender of the Rule of Law"
(2006) 31:2 Queen's U 598 at 602; Dodek, "Intersection," supra note 10 at 20-2 1.
125. Supra note 107 at 37 [footnotes omitted].
126. Supra note 80 at para 41. See also Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 19; Manitoba Metis
Federation, supra note 79 at para 75; Beckman, supra note 84 at para 12.
127. The Alberta Natural Resources TransferAgreement, 1930, being Schedule 2 to the Constitution Act,
1930, 20-21 George V c 26 (UK) [reprinted inRSC 1985, App II, No 26].
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Parliament and the legislatures to scrutinize the impacts of proposed
legislation and regulations on section 35 rights, ensuring that legislative
objectives are attained in ways that uphold the honour of the Crown.12
Government lawyers have a critical role in fulfilling this obligation-what
is treaty, statutory and constitutional interpretation and scrutiny if not the
work of lawyers?
In supporting the business of the Crown, however, lawyers do more
than just interpret documents. Government lawyers also provide advice
on specific determinations and decisions, and on policy development and
implementation. In all matters concerning the Crown's relationships with
Indigenous peoples, ensuring that government decision-making complies
with the law is of paramount importance.129 Discretionary Crown decisions
must be made within constitutional limits, including the honour of the
Crown principle,130 and the advice of lawyers can be critical in ensuring
these limits are respected. Crown clients may also reasonably ask lawyers
for advice more generally focused on ensuring consistency with the honour
of the Crown in approaches to reconciliation-focused mandates, decision-
making or policy development.
Constitutional principles tend to be more normative in nature than
subject to clear legal tests.131 As a result, they can be less amenable to
traditional risk-based legal advice than other bases for liability. Crown
counsel may need to be nimbler (or perhaps, if not too heretical, more
creative) than in other contexts in framing and providing legal advice
regarding the honour of the Crown.
The Supreme Court in Haida Nation, referring to reconciliation and
honourable approaches to betaken by the Crown in the context of the duty
to consult, advised against taking a "legalistic" approach and demanding
"the distant goal of proof."132 Similarly, in providing legal advice informed
by the honour of the Crown, lawyers may need to let themselves be guided
more on the level of principle than technical, legalistic arguments. In
addition to a traditional legal risk assessment, it may be appropriate-
and indeed complementary-to address the more normative, principle-
based question: is this course of conduct consistent with the honour of the
Crown and the reconciliation mandate demanded by the courts in Canada?
128. Supra note 80 at 1110.
129. See Wilkins, supra note 107 generally at 33-36.
130. See Beckman, supra note 84 at paras 45, 57.
131. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's discussion of democracy in the Secession Reference,
supra note 86, which is described as a "fundamental value" (ibid at para 61) and "a sort of baseline
against which the framers of our Constitution, and subsequently, our elected representatives under it,
have always operated" (ibid at para 62).
132. Supra note 2 at para 33.
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Or perhaps more practically: will this course of conduct raise the spectre
of sharp dealing, or will it assist in, or be consistent with, reconciling
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests?
Traditional legal risk assessments are still necessary. As discussed,
the honour of the Crown also gives rise to obligations, the breach of
which can be actionable and lead to liability. This was most clearly
exemplified in Manitoba Mtis Federation, which provides a more
traditional legal framework to assess Crown conduct (i.e. the duty of
diligent implementation).133 In this way, the honour of the Crown requires
government lawyers to provide rigorous legal advice, including risk
assessments, regarding breaches of obligations and the attendant potential
for liability. Such considerations are a necessary part of giving complete
and diligent legal advice to Crown clients.
Solicitor-client privilege precludes public scrutiny of much of the
work of lawyers. There is no public access to the advice provided to
Crown clients that could be used to hold government lawyers to account in
providing honour of the Crown advice. There is also no way to determine,
unless expressly disclosed, whether Crown clients are acting on the advice
of lawyers.
13 4
There is some debate on whether legal advice provided to the Crown
should be made public. Dodek has argued that governments should claim
privilege less often, and indeed "proactively disclose legal advice in
specific matters,"'135 to promote accountability of government lawyers and
to "strengthen the democratic onversation between government and the
citizenry."136 Hutchinson makes a similar argument that privilege should not
apply by emphasizing that "the basic democratic ommitment to openness
and transparency as a vital prerequisite for accountability suggests that
133. While the declaration in that case was not paired with any binding orders, the force of the
condemnation by the Supreme Court has nevertheless had significant implications for the federal
Crown and provided the impetus to begin addressing the historical broken promise. For example, in
response to the decision in Manitoba Metis Federation, the federal Minister of (then) Indigenous and
Northern Affairs Canada appointed lawyer Thomas I aac as the Minister's Special Representative
on Reconciliation with Metis, leading to Isaac's report, A Matter of National and Constitutional
Import (Isaac, supra note 90). This then in part led to the federal government and the Manitoba Metis
Federation signing a "Framework Agreement on Reconciliation" in 2017 that includes among its
purposes "to arrive at a shared solution that advances reconciliation between the Parties consistent
with the purpose of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and the Supreme Court of Canada's
decision in Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada (AG)" (s. 1.1.2); online: <www.rcaanc-cirnac.
gc.ca/eng/1502395273330/1539711712698> [perma.cc/N7ZP-UHQ8].
134. As Wilkins, supra note 107 notes at 41: "The advice or recommendation a government counsel
is giving her client internally may be quite different from the positioning she is instructed to articulate
externally: a fact that confidentiality constraints preclude her from disclosing publicly."
135. Dodek, "Intersection," supra note 10 at 45-47 (quote from 45).
136. Ibid at 47.
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there is very little role for confidentiality in the affairs of government.""13
(We also note the Truth and Reconciliation Commission recommended that
the federal government "develop a policy of transparency by publishing
legal opinions it develops and upon which it acts or intends to act, in
regard to the scope and extent of Aboriginal and Treaty rights.""13 ) These
arguments have been sharply criticized by other commentators, who argue
that privilege is necessary for frankness between government lawyers and
the government as client, without which the quality of legal advice sought
and provided will be diminished.39
We note that privilege promotes an unvarnished and fully-canvassed
exchange of opinions and ideas within government which is critical to
ensuring that public policy is developed and implemented in as robust and
defensible a manner as possible. As Monahan puts it, the effect of reducing
privilege "would be to make it significantly more difficult and challenging
to protect the rule of law within government."40 The legal protection of
solicitor-client privilege is very strong and the few exceptions to privilege
are applied narrowly.41 We expect that solicitor-client privilege will
continue to be claimed by, and apply to, governments-and rightly so.
Regardless of the dictates of privilege, government lawyers, like all
other lawyers, have a duty to provide competent and candid advice to
the client.4 Any advice that does not incorporate the legal principle of
the honour of the Crown, where that principle is relevant, is incomplete.
However, we argue that Crown clients-even more than typical clients-
likewise have an obligation to ensure they are getting the most complete
legal advice possible to inform their decisions. This includes insisting,
where applicable, that the advice requested from government lawyers
137. Supra note 9 at 126
138. TRC Calls to Action, supra note 2, Call to Action 51.
139. See, e.g., Monahan, supra note 21 at 52-54; Morris & Nishikawa, supra note 8 at 178-180.
140. Supra note 21 at 54. See also Morris & Nishikawa, supra note 8 at 179: "there canbe serious
negative unintended consequences that threaten to undermine the Rule of law and the public interest."
141. For a thorough discussion of the exceptions, see Adam M Dodek, Solicitor-Client Privilege
(Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2014) at paras 8.1-8.165.
142. FLSC Model Code, supra note 13, r 3.2-2, commentary [2]: "A lawyer's duty to a client who
seeks legal advice is to give the client a competent opinion based on a sufficient knowledge of the
relevant facts, an adequate consideration of the applicable law and the lawyer's own experience
and expertise. The advice must be open and undisguised and must clearly disclose what the lawyer
honestly thinks about the merits and probable results." See also r 3.2-2: "When advising a client, a
lawyer must be honest and candid." See also rr 3.1-1, 3.1-2 on competence. For a more extensive
analysis of the duties of the lawyer as advisor, see Alice Woolley, "The Lawyer as Advisor and the
Practice of the Rule of Law" (2014) 47:2 UBC L Rev 743. Woolley at 746 states that "the lawyer as
advisor must provide an objectively reasonable assessment of he law and its application to the client's
situation, while shaping that assessment and its application to assist the client to achieve his or her
goals."
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includes honour of the Crown considerations. As the Supreme Court
stated in Haida Nation: "The controlling question in all situations is what
is required to maintain the honour of the Crown and to effect reconciliation
between the Crown and the Aboriginal peoples with respect o the interests
at stake.1143 This question should be an integral part of the requests for
legal advice put to government lawyers, where applicable.
In the role of government lawyer as advisor, the honour of the Crown
does not impose a special ethical obligation. While the government as
client has particular legal obligations under the honour of the Crown, the
lawyer's obligations are unchanged. The lawyer's standard obligation
to provide competent and candid advice applies, and competent advice
must be informed by the legal principle of the honour of the Crown, when
necessary.
2. Lawyer as the 'face" of the Crown
There are also public dimensions to the work of government lawyers when
lawyers engage directly with non-clients. Sometimes government lawyers
engage on the strict instruction of their clients and other times under broad
directions to pursue and fulfill their clients' objectives. In some contexts,
particularly where government lawyers have greater discretion in how they
engage with Indigenous parties, we argue that the honour of the Crown
imposes an additional ethical obligation of honourable dealing.
Litigation is the most obvious example of a context in which
government lawyers act as the public face of the Crown. Litigation is
conducted on the instruction of clients, and the positions and arguments
made in the course of litigation are generally those of the client, for whom
counsel speaks.144 As Wilkins notes:
The government client frequently accepts the lawyers' recommendations,
especially if they have been brokered carefully in advance with counsel
for the client departments or ministries. But there is no guarantee that it
will do so, and when it does not, the task (and professional obligation)
of the government lawyer is to act in accordance with the instructions
she has received, regardless of her professional opinion or personal
preference (that, or find another client), unless the instructions would
require doing something that is flat-out illegal.'45
143. Supra note 2 at para 45.
144. See Wilkins, supra note 107 at 37. Wilkins highlights what he characterizes as even stricter
requirements on government lawyers to act pursuant to approved instructions or mandates than their
colleagues in private practice: "In matters of any real import, it will almost always be necessary
to obtain the approval, or at least the acquiescence, of senior officials in the justice department or
ministry and of all the government departments or ministries whose interests the litigation is perceived
to affect."
145. Ibid at 38.
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Nevertheless, there are any number of in-the-moment decisions and choices
that arise in the course of litigation-in the immediacy of the courtroom,
or in settlement conference, or during the exchange of information and
documentation-that do not rise to the level of requiring client instruction
and which require lawyers to act honourably and respectfully. However,
this approach to conduct is already an integral part of lawyers' professional
responsibilities and we argue there are not any additional or higher ethical
obligations as a result of the honour of the Crown principle. In particular,
lawyers have an overarching duty to "be courteous and civil and act in
good faith with all persons with whom the lawyer has dealings in the
course of his or her practice."'146 More specifically, lawyers "must avoid
sharp practice and must not take advantage of or act without fair warning
upon slips, irregularities or mistakes on the part of other lawyers not going
to the merits or involving the sacrifice of a client's rights.""4 7
On the other hand, there can be significant strategic choices related
to the conduct of litigation that are not in-the-moment or routine, where
clients may defer to litigation counsel. These include decisions like the
choice of witnesses; approaches to cross-examination; and the focus, tone
and organization of written and oral submissions. In some circumstances,
such decisions may be appropriately at counsels' discretion, in which case
the discussion that follows may apply to some extent in litigation contexts.
However, we are cautious not to collapse the distinction between situations
where discretion on the part of counsel is necessary and appropriate and
situations where the Crown client fails to properly instruct or supervise
the conduct of litigation. It is our view that the honour of the Crown
does not generally impose additional ethical obligations on government
lawyers in the conduct of litigation, but the honour of the Crown may
impose additional duties or obligations on the Crown clients in providing
instructions to government lawyers.48 A full exploration of the ethical
obligations of Crown clients in the conduct of litigation is beyond the
scope of this article.
146. FLSC Model Code, supra note 13, r 7.2-1.
147. Ibid, r 7.2-2.
148. For example, in Tsilhqot'in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 SCR 257
[Tsilhqot'in Nation] the Supreme Court suggested that in certain cases taking an overly technical
approach to pleadings will be inconsistent with reconciliation (ibid at para 23). While the Court did
not explicitly frame this as an honour of the Crown issue, we suggest that here is a nexus between
overly technical litigation strategies that either ignore or obscure the underlying substantive issues at
play in a claim and serve only to cause delay, and the "sharp dealing" that runs afoul of the honour
of the Crown While lawyers may provide the advice to employ technical strategies (engaging the
considerations we have flagged above), the decisions about how to conduct litigation and the positions
and arguments relied on remain those of the Crown clients.
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The additional ethical obligation, in our view, applies in contexts
where government lawyers are interacting with Indigenous people and
their representatives directly and have discretion in determining how
those engagements unfold. For simplicity, we focus on what we refer to
as "negotiation." However, these interactions do not always resemble
traditional notions of negotiation, but rather may include a range of
engagements from very informal, exploratory and ad hoc (e.g. setting out
relationship principles or policy engagement) to very formal, moderated
and subject to set parameters and rules of conduct (e.g. claim settlement
negotiations).149 In such contexts, lawyers may function as negotiators
themselves, or as advisors to negotiators. We are not distinguishing between
these functions but rather focusing on the potentially significant degree of
discretion government lawyers may have. This broad notion of negotiation
has become a critical aspect of the Crown's relationships with Indigenous
peoples and fulfilling Indigenous-specific mandates and objectives. It is the
preferred approach to a wide spectrum of matters, including modem land
claim agreements, harvesting arrangements, sector-specific relationship
building, and the provision of social and economic programming.
The courts have signalled consistently that negotiation is the preferred
approach to advancing reconciliation, in part because litigation processes
expend resources and perpetuate distrust.15 Nevertheless, the nature of
negotiation is implicitly legalistic. It often involves lawyers, is conducted
under carefully crafted agreements or protocols, and is undertaken with
the aim of concluding detailed settlements or coming to agreements with
regard to the recognition and exercise of section 35 rights. Indigenous
parties are increasingly represented in these types of engagements with
the Crown by sophisticated, experienced legal counsel. In this context, the
onus increasingly falls on government lawyers to act as key members of
negotiating teams rather than just as background advisors to Crown clients
as they would otherwise.
We identify the key difference between litigation and negotiation as
the degree of discretion accorded the government lawyer in developing
and advancing positions. In the adversarial litigation context, lawyers
149. We do acknowledge that the more formal the negotiations, the stricter the mandates will be and
latitude in how settlement agreements are reached may be reduced. See Wilkins, supra note 107 at
37. However, our argument for the purposes of this article is that the term "negotiations" can cover
a broad range of engagements, many of which do not involve formal mandates, changes to which
require approval of senior officials. Additionally, we argue that unlike the litigation settlement context
to which Wilkins is primarily referring, in non-litigation-based negotiations-even where there is a
formal mandate in place-approvals may be required for changes to the outcomes, but determining
how the mandated outcomes are achieved remains more in the control of the negotiators.
150. See Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 25; Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 186.
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speak on behalf of their clients by advancing pre-approved positions. In
other words, the parties advancing the positions are the clients, speaking
through their lawyers. The outcome is defined by these positions since the
court either accepts or rejects the positions taken by the parties on the law
and/or facts.
In the negotiation context, the "outcome" is defined by the negotiation,
policy or program mandates-the objectives or goals of each party to the
particular interaction-and may be broad and fluid. The clients determine
the mandates or goals, but the negotiators, including government lawyers-
while it may vary from context to context-often have broad discretion in
achieving those mandates.151 When overly technical approaches are taken
in litigation, it is on the instruction of the client. When overly technical
approaches are taken in negotiation, it is more often the choice of the
people sitting at the table.
As an approach to conduct, the honour of the Crown may inform
what the Supreme Court in Haida Nation characterized as "honourable
negotiation."'152 While that case dealt specifically with the duty to consult,
we adopt this term to apply to the practical notion of people sitting at a
negotiation table. When at a negotiation table, a government lawyer may be
presented with a position or argument that challenges her and/or her client's
view of the Crown's legal obligations in the given circumstances. She has
the choice of vigorously and vociferously challenging the Indigenous
negotiating partner's view, or listening respectfully, transparently flagging
her hesitancy, and committing to consider and provide her client with
advice in order to prepare an informed response. Even where the position
posed is ultimately inconsistent with the Crown's negotiation mandate,
it will only be in rare (if any) circumstances where no consideration can
reasonably be given, or that the position cannot be aired respectfully in the
hopes of stimulating alternative, productive discussion.
Lawyers trained in the common law tradition generally have a strong
litigious and adversarial instinct, in addition to a desire to protect the
interests of their clients, which they have committed to serve. The duty
of zealous advocacy-albeit within some limits-is, in many ways, a
defining imperative of the profession.53 However, we argue that what
151. Possible mandates include set compensation ranges with associated releases or other
consideration, particular policy outcomes or service provision, and agreements on future conduct.
152. Supra note 2 at para 20.
153. See, e.g., FLSC Model Code, supra note 13, r 5.1-1, and commentary [1]. See also, e.g., R v
Felderhof(2003), 68 OR (3d) 481 at para 84, 180 CCC (3d) 498 (CA), Rosenberg JA, albeit in the
context of criminal defence: "Zealous advocacy on behalf of a client, to advance the client's case
and protect that client's rights, is a cornerstone of our adversary system"-quoted with approval in
Groia v The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2016 ONCA 471 at para 129, 131 OR (3d) 1, for the
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generally represents appropriate zealous advocacy in the context of
negotiating a complex commercial arrangement, undertaking engagements
on regulatory reform, or settling civil litigation in matters not related to
claims by Indigenous people, must be reconsidered in contexts where
the honour of the Crown is engaged. In these circumstances, government
lawyers need to consider what zealous advocacy means in light of their
role as Crown servants. They are bound by the individual dimension of
the honour of the Crown principle, while also required to fulfill their
professional obligations to act in the best interests of their Crown clients.
3. The duty ofhonourable dealing
We argue that when government lawyers act as the face of the Crown
in negotiations with Indigenous peoples, they have an additional ethical
obligation, which we characterize as a duty of honourable dealing.15 4 The
duty of honourable dealing requires that government lawyers infuse their
approaches to dealing with Indigenous parties with the honour of the
Crown principle.
This duty does not imply acceding to all arguments raised by
Indigenous representatives. Government lawyers still have professional
duties to advise their clients to the best of their abilities, which includes
diligent determinations of whether arguments raised across the table are
supportable in law, legal risks, and the range of potential outcomes for
any decision or course of action. As part of the responsible and diligent
provision of legal advice, government lawyers should explore the
boundaries of where agreement is not legally required. In this way, the
duty of honourable dealing that we propose is not quite a moderation of
zealous advocacy, as discussed above. Rather, we argue that the duty of
zealous advocacy continues to apply, but it is zealous advocacy towards
a different goal. The Crown client itself is subject to the honour of the
Crown principle. Consequently, zealously advocating for the Crown client
requires acknowledging Indigenous peoples not just as the parties on the
proposition that "The courts have unreservedly acknowledged that zealous advocacy is fundamental
to the advocate's role." But see ibid at para 132: "The duty of zealous advocacy must be jealously
protected and broadly construed. But it is not absolute and must not be abused. Nor do the Conduct
Rules assign it paramountcy."
154. This name is inspired by Brent Cotter's "duty of fair dealing": Cotter, "Lawyers Representing
Public Government," supra note 6. Elizabeth Sanderson comes to a similarly framed conclusion from
a different analysis. See Elizabeth Sanderson, Government Lawyering: Duties and Ethical Challenges
of Government Lawyers (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2018) at 201-203 (quote is from 203): "the
honour of the Crown is a public law imperative on government lawyers additional to their professional
duty of civility. At a minimum, it requires government lawyers to remain attuned to the imperative
of honourable conduct, acting honourably at all times when dealing with Indigenous claimants."
[Emphasis in original].
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other side of the table, but as constitutionally recognized peoples to whom
the Crown client owes special obligations.
A cue can be taken from the duty to consult case law in which the
courts have been clear that there is no duty to agree;155 rather the process
of consultation must be meaningful.156 Similarly, consistent with the
honour of the Crown principle, negotiation processes must be meaningful,
with a candid exchange of positions and views that are all carefully and
respectfully considered. In practical terms, the question to guide how
government lawyers conduct themselves in negotiation may simply be:
is this engagement process truly "meaningful," or is the spectre of sharp
dealing a real risk?
In this respect, our "duty of honourable dealing" has some tonal
similarities to Cotter's "duty of fair dealing." Just as Cotter roots his duty
in the obligations a government owes to its citizens, "including the ones
with whom it is in conflict," our duty is rooted in the honour of the Crown,
a legal duty owed to Indigenous peoples.15 Similarly, Cotter notes that his
duty "does not mean that governments must accede to any allegation made
by a claimant, or acquiesce in the face of every challenge to its policies."'158
Our duty, however, is grounded in a specific legal principle that applies not
only to the Crown as an institution but also to the conduct of individual
Crown servants, including lawyers.
The duty of honourable dealing, like the special ethical obligations
of Crown prosecutors, is fundamentally rooted in the level of discretion
afforded counsel in negotiations with Indigenous groups. We acknowledge
the concern in the literature over unsupported comparisons to Crown
prosecutors, and we make this comparison in a deliberate and specific
way. For government lawyers, it may be useful to think of discretion as
sitting on a spectrum. At one end, with near absolute discretion, are Crown
prosecutors and at the other, with minimal discretion, are civil litigators. In
between, with substantial discretion, are government lawyers in Indigenous
negotiation contexts. Unlike Crown prosecutors, the government lawyer
in the Indigenous context does have a client. However, as discussed, at
times the government lawyer has a great deal of leeway in moderating her
conduct and shaping how the Crown client's overall goals are met. Whereas
155. Except where Aboriginal title is proven, in which case the title holding Aboriginal group's
consent is required for any Crown use of the title lands, otherwise the Crown will have to justify any
infringement in accordance with the strict justification test set out in the case law; Tsilhqot'in Nation,
supra note 148 at paras 2, 76, 88, 90-92.
156. See Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 42; Clyde River, supra note 90 at para 23.
157. Cotter, "Lawyers Representing Public Government," supra note 6 at 116.
158. Ibid.
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the absolute discretion of Crown prosecutors brings with it the strongest
ethical obligations, the substantial discretion of these government lawyers
brings ethical obligations that are not as strong but are similar in kind.
Like Crown prosecutors, there is not a duty to seek a "win" in the typical
sense. In other words, the desired result is not necessarily a "victory" over
the other party. Instead, like the Crown prosecutor, the government lawyer
in the Indigenous context has a duty "to see that justice is done" insofar
as the honour of the Crown is aimed at reconciliation and against sharp
dealing.
Conclusion
In this article, we have argued that the honour of the Crown imposes
an additional ethical obligation on government lawyers working on
Indigenous matters in limited circumstances For the government lawyer
as advisor, the honour of the Crown does not impose special ethical
obligations. Instead, the honour of the Crown forms an important and
required component of that advice. However, for the government lawyer
acting as the "face" of the Crown in negotiation contexts, which we have
defined broadly, the honour of the Crown imposes an additional ethical
obligation that we call a duty of honourable dealing. This obligation has
some similarities to the special obligations of Crown prosecutors in that it
is partly based on the level of discretion granted to government lawyers in
the negotiation context.
What are the implications for government lawyers? While the
honour of the Crown imposes an additional ethical obligation in some
circumstances, that obligation is not inconsistent with the interests of the
client or the role of the lawyer. Indeed, this duty of honourable dealing is
consistent with the lawyer's standard commitment to zealous advocacy,
while furthering the goal of reconciliation. Reconciliation is undeniably in
the public interest and is therefore a legitimate goal of the government o
be weighed alongside other goals. In the same way that all lawyers work
to further the goals of the client, government lawyers work to help the
government client reach this goal. For these reasons, government lawyers
should enthusiastically embrace this additional ethical obligation.
All lawyers have a part to play in the project of reconciliation, as
the TRC Calls to Action make clear. Cultural competency training, for
example, is relevant for all lawyers, regardless of their clients or practice
areas.159 But the honour of the Crown has particular ramifications for
government lawyers who advise and represent governments in their
159. TRC Calls to Action, supra note 2, Call to Action 27.
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dealings with Indigenous peoples. Fulfilling the obligation of honourable
dealing is a serious but surmountable challenge. Both governments as
employers and law societies as regulators have a role to play in building
capacity and supporting government lawyers in this respect, particularly
through continuing professional development. Indeed, given the mobility
of lawyers within government and the dynamic nature of government
practice, all government lawyers should be trained to recognize when the
duty of honourable dealing will arise and how to proceed when it does.
Governments should prioritize developing expertise in this area, most
likely among those branches that deal most directly and most often with
Indigenous affairs, that can be shared across government when needed.
